In This Section |
Livestock
Border Closure Contingency Plan
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| Author: | OMAFRA Staff |
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| Creation Date: | 27 September 2007 |
| Last Reviewed: | 27 September 2007 |
1. Purpose of the Plan
2. Core Proposition
3. The Background and Rationale
4. Stage 1 Report Conclusions
5. Stage One Report Recommendations
For Stage One of the project, the OMAFRA contingency planning team was tasked with researching and analysing existing plans, background information and the potential impacts a border closure would have on the economy in Ontario, Canada and subsequently on the livestock production and processing industries.
To secure a formal action plan to be implemented in the event that the border between Canada and the U.S. or another significant trading partner is closed to the export of livestock and livestock products from Ontario. The goal of the final plan will be to help maintain infrastructure and maximize sustainability of the pork and beef production and processing sectors during any disruption to border traffic.
The plan will be developed in two stages and will include sector specific analysis. The plan will focus on the hog and cattle industries. First, a review of existing plans, background information and assessment of potential impacts of a border closure will be conducted. The second stage will involve developing strategies in cooperation with industry to mitigate the impacts. This report completes stage one.
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Events in the recent past have shown the enormous impact of border closures on the viability of livestock industries in Ontario. The closure of international borders (the U.S. border in particular) to Canadian ruminants and ruminant products in response to the discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Alberta has cost the Ontario economy at least $945 million . This has led to a real recognition in the province of the vulnerability of the livestock sector to border closure threats such as a foreign animal disease outbreak.
There are many scenarios that could lead to Ontario borders being closed to the export of livestock and livestock products. Among others, these could include food safety issues, political/trade issues, disasters and pandemics. The most obvious, however, would be a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak in the province.
Regardless of the reason for the border closure, it is clear from the research conducted for this report that Ontario would experience major impacts. Economic losses for export markets alone would total $23 million per week for both beef and swine. Further estimated losses of $13.5 million and $25 million per week for the swine and beef industries, respectively, could be faced if sales and movement within the province are totally restricted. This does not include the effect on rural businesses that deal directly with producers or the 19,000 production workers in the province whose jobs depend on meat products manufacturing. Therefore, a plan that attempts to help mitigate these potential impacts is needed
In discussions with various industry partners there is no doubt that this issue is of great concern. The cattle industry has seen, and is still experiencing, the effects of the discovery of BSE in 2003 that closed international borders. The pork industry has identified the potential for market collapse as a key issue. The feed industry recognizes the potential impact that a border closure could have. In the current climate the key focus of the livestock industry remains on the immediate response to a FAD. However, work on dealing with the potential market surplus of livestock and livestock products resulting from a border closure has only begun, although many lessons have already been learned from the discovery of BSE in western Canada. In general, industry welcomes OMAFRA's involvement in attempting to develop a contingency plan.
In the case of a FAD, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), under the authority of the Health of Animals Act would have the lead role in stamping out the disease. Recognizing this, the CFIA, Emergency Management Ontario (EMO) and the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (OMAFRA) together have developed a Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Response Plan (FADERP) to coordinate efforts in the event of a FAD outbreak.
The Ontario Ministry of Transportation (MTO) is currently developing plans to deal with truck traffic at the U.S. Windsor border crossing in the event of a border closure. The need for special considerations for livestock transport in such a situation is recognized and is being incorporated into these plans.
However, Ontario has no detailed or coordinated plan to deal with the business continuity issues that would result from excess healthy livestock and safe livestock products that no longer have a market because of a border closure.
Other provinces have done varying degrees of work on contingency planning for a border closure related to livestock. Manitoba is in a similar position to Ontario with respect to the pork industry, in that large numbers of pigs are exported and would have no market within the province if the border closed. However, Manitoba's plan centres on the designation of mass burial sites for disposal, but offers no solutions on business continuity. Alberta has a plan for the immediate emergency rerouting of animal transports in the event of a border closure, but again has no specific plans for business continuity.
Saskatchewan is now requiring that any new livestock operations covered under the Agricultural Operations Act have a mass carcass disposal plan. The province is also encouraging existing operations to develop similar plans when plans are renewed. While at first glance this might seem like a useful idea, population density and livestock operations on small land bases, particularly in southern parts of the province, might make this difficult to institute in Ontario.
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Nationally, the Pork Value Chain Roundtable has focused attention on this issue and the potential resulting market collapse. A working group report submitted to the Roundtable in September (2006) made a number of valuable recommendations centering on four key areas:
OMAFRA staff has been sharing information with the Roundtable regarding this effort and will continue to liaise with them as work on this issue progresses. It needs to be recognized that the issues that would be evident in a border closure would not be unique to Ontario and although Ontario needs to prepare for the potential of a border closure, a national voice is also needed when dealing with national borders and international trading partners.
The United States has a National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management. However, the primary focus appears to be on disease surveillance and eradication, not on addressing surplus animals and products because of a national border closure.
Some individual states within the U.S have begun to examine business continuity issues. Iowa has created a Center for Agriculture Security and, although the primary focus appears to be emergency response, one of their listed responsibilities is to assess the threats and vulnerabilities to the agriculture industry. Further investigation of this organization might be warranted to determine if there are ideas that could be transplanted to Ontario.
North Carolina appears to be the state that has done the most work to push FAD response beyond disease eradication to include business continuity. This was spurred by a short state to state border closure situation, which occurred due to a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) scare. The ideas provided from North Carolina are worth pursuing, however, in order for them to be effective the trading partners involved must agree on standards before an actual disease outbreak or other border closure incident happens. Also, while such agreements may be possible, state to state or province to province, developing standards and having them accepted on both sides of an international border is a much more difficult proposition. Even if an agreement based on solid science could be reached it could still be thwarted by political realities. However, the potential benefits make it worth pursuing.
Dr. J.P. Vaillancourt DVM, University of Montreal and formerly with North Carolina State's College of Veterinary Medicine suggests that a first step to developing an agreement with the United States on border closure issues would be to build some direct relationships between Ontario and its significant trading states. If there is mutual agreement then national authorities could be approached on both sides of the border to attempt to work towards a recognized agreement .
Internationally, there has been a great deal of work done on planning for FAD response and eradication, but less has been done to deal with the business continuity issues of a border closed to exports from healthy animals and safe product. Some of this is likely due to the degree of a country's dependence on exports.
Taiwan's solution to their 1997 FMD outbreak and the subsequent loss of export markets was to essentially downsize their industry to domestic needs. While this is an option that any jurisdiction must seriously and realistically consider, particularly if the situation is not easily controlled, the goal of the Livestock Border Closure Contingency Plan will be to help maintain infrastructure and maximize sustainability of the beef and pork sectors.
The U.K., Denmark and Australia all have extensive disease response plans, but border closure contingency /business continuity plans do not appear to be as detailed.
The Netherlands has experienced several disease outbreaks and the resulting fallout from a border closure situation. In the pork industry they have used insemination bans, aborting of sows and the killing of young piglets to deal with excess supply. Insemination bans and abortion of sows were not well received by producers because of the disruption to sow herd management. On the other hand veterinarians were opposed to killing of young piglets for ethical reasons. Nevertheless, these ideas should be further explored in an Ontario context.
Miranda Meuwissen of the Netherlands' Institute for Risk Management in Agriculture, Wageningen (IRMA) suggests there are only a few options for dealing with an excess supply of healthy animals in affected zones:
In zones with movement restrictions:
In the case of emergency vaccination:
While these are options for use within zones with movement restrictions they nevertheless would equally apply to the Ontario situation of healthy animals and products outside these zones with no immediate market.
For Ontario, slaughter and storage capacity issues would seem to dictate that the slaughter and storing of meat is difficult to implement. Creation of internal zones within the province may also present difficulties because of the province wide nature of the livestock industry and rapid movement of livestock throughout the province. It also needs to be recognized that any agreements with trading partners on zoning would ultimately need to be developed on a national level because trade is a federal issue. There appears to be value in the West Hawk Lake project which would create an east/west division of the country. However, since this is a national issue Ontario can only encourage this work to move forward. If, beyond these efforts, euthanizing and disposing of the excess animals is the only other option left then best options need to be developed to carry this out in the most effective manner that balances business continuity, environmental and ethical concerns.
Canadian consumers are already world leaders in the consumption of pork and beef. As noted, projections for changes in consumption by 2020 include a 3% increase for pork but a 14% decrease for beef. Therefore, there is no natural trend toward a major increase in consumption. While the discovery of BSE did prove that maintaining consumer confidence, together with extensive marketing campaigns, can in fact increase consumption it also showed that there is potential to negatively affect consumption of other meat proteins. Despite the BSE experience, the risk of losing consumer confidence and a resulting drop in consumption may be greater than the opportunity to maintain or increase consumption. Either way, consumer confidence will be a key factor in determining the impact of a border closure and an effective plan to maintain that confidence is vital.
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Ontario has an overall positive trade balance in fresh, frozen and chilled pork. Based on 2005 national trade data, if the border were to close to pork, Ontario consumers would need to consume an extra 7 kg of pork per year per capita, an increase of 28%. It would be unrealistic to suggest that this is possible.
Overall, beef trade balances have been volatile due to the BSE situation in Alberta. However, using the same 2005 trade data, if the border were to close to beef, Ontario consumers would need to consume an extra .9 kg per capita or 3%.
It is important to keep in mind that these numbers do not include live hogs and cattle that would normally be exported and would also be adding to the surplus.
As expected, trade data suggests that the U.S. is Canada's major trading partner accounting for 82% of beef exports and 42% of pork exports. In addition, almost all Ontario live cattle (net trade balance of $39 million in 2005) and live hog exports (net trade balance of $210 million in 2005) are sent to the U.S. To illustrate the magnitude of the problem over 43,000 live pigs are exported from Ontario every week. These would have no market should the border close. Therefore, a border closure involving the U.S. would obviously have a devastating impact. With respect to pork, Japan is also a major trading partner at 36% of pork exports and a border issue with that country would also have serious repercussions.
Ontario's feed industry would be affected to varying degrees depending on their reliance on export markets. Also, the ability to access specific feed ingredients may be more limited and, therefore, could affect profitability for both feed companies and producers.
Due to Ontario's huge reliance on export trade in livestock and livestock products, maintaining positive relationships with our trading partners needs to be a key focus for both industry and government. Domestic consumption cannot sustain the current production of either the beef or pork industries. Every effort needs to be made to prevent a border closure because BSE has shown that re-establishing lost markets is difficult and comes with added restrictions and costs that reduce profitability but must be absorbed.
Excess capacity to house, slaughter or dispose of surplus animals within Ontario is relatively minimal when compared to the large numbers of animals that would need to be managed. On-farm the beef sector has an obvious advantage in managing surplus animals. The pork sector is in a much more precarious position and could see major on-farm impacts within a week of a border closure.
Slaughter capacity hinges on markets for the product. In the event of a border closure the use of any excess capacity would depend on the availability of markets. The greater danger may be that slaughter plants could close if product cannot be exported, creating an even larger volume of surplus animals. Even if alternative markets could be found storage capacity would be the limiting factor to increasing slaughter volumes. At the same time barriers to the creation of increased slaughter capacity within the province should be thoroughly investigated to see if there are options for their removal.
Rendering capacity is also near maximums under current regulatory limits. In fact, most of Eastern Ontario is serviced by Quebec based facilities. While there are some opportunities for additional capacity to be brought on-line, markets and the ability to render on weekends are hurdles that need to be addressed.
Prevention of a border closure incident remains the best avenue to help mitigate its impacts. With respect to a FAD, biosecurity is a key component. Depending on perceived risk, biosecurity levels vary across livestock sectors. A recent study by the Ontario Livestock and Poultry Council showed that biosecurity is a higher priority in the pork industry than in the beef sector but it also showed there is still room for improvement in all sectors. A lack of national standards and verifiable protocols has hampered further progress. In addition, biosecurity awareness must be improved among small hobby farmers. Overall, Ontario needs to further enhance biosecurity in the province.
Traceability through premise identification and animal movement controls would greatly aid efforts to control a FAD, but could also prove useful in other border closure events. Therefore, efforts to enhance traceability need to continue to be supported.
Legislative authority to properly deal with surplus animals and product in the event of a border closure is also an issue that needs further investigation. In the event of a FAD the CFIA would have immediate authority to deal with the disease. What needs to be realized in this situation is that the CFIA's authority begins and ends with the stamping out of the FAD. Any excess livestock and livestock products outside CFIA's mandate to control the disease would need to be dealt with domestically in Ontario if the border was closed. Since there are potential reasons for a border closure other than a FAD, who would take the lead role in dealing with these situations? Would it be industry or government (Provincial/Federal), or both? If farms need to be depopulated how would this be carried out and by whom? Which farms would be chosen and would breeding stock be protected? These questions must be answered and the potential need for additional legislative authority needs to be investigated.
Communication and cooperation between industry partners and government would also become a key issue during a border closure. Ontario needs to consider further developing the necessary links to facilitate this. The need for information, including that of the general public can be satisfied through a coordinated approach.
In evaluating all the structural and economic impacts, the human impact must not be forgotten. If farms are being depopulated or businesses are forced to shut down due to a closed border, this presents challenges for people whose livelihoods are in jeopardy. Maintaining support systems and business continuity plans will be crucial to avoiding a severe human toll, as well as the potential loss of industry expertise.
Overall, the livestock industry is working hard to deal with the immediate fallout of a FAD, but has not yet devoted significant resources to the potential for market collapse resulting from the large surplus of animals and product that would develop in the wake of a border closure. Research for this report clearly shows that a plan is needed to help mitigate the impacts of a border closure.
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The recommendations have been grouped under a number of key headings. They include:
1. A coordinated livestock border closure contingency plan should be developed and would be welcomed by industry.
2. Explore options for the prevention of incidents that could cause
the border to close. Prevention is the best solution to the potential
problem.
3. Promote continued efforts towards improved provincial biosecurity.
Consider the development of standard protocols and possible need for
regulation.
4. Support the implementation of current and future traceability initiatives.
5. Examine the value of the West Hawk Lake Project and whether Ontario
should make efforts to help move this and other potential zoning projects
forward.
6. Encourage development of a strategy to develop biosecurity in non-regulated
and non-commercial species including backyard flocks and other hobby
farm animals.
7. Consider the expansion of training and programs for first responders
involved in prevention, biosecurity and mass carcass disposal prior
to a border closure.
8. Maintain communication and a co-operative working relationship
with the National Pork and Beef Value Chain Roundtables as they develop
plans to deal with a potential market collapse.
9. Investigate the necessary communication and information links with
industry and other levels of government that would be needed to deal
with a border closure situation.
10. Develop a communications and awareness strategy the public for
border closure issues.
11. Further develop and support direct relationships with U.S. states
that import a large percentage of Ontario's livestock with the intent
of working towards common trade goals with national authorities on
both sides of the border.
12. Develop a communications and awareness strategy for industry (primary
producers, processors and related service providers) for border closure
issues.
13. Review the legislative authority needs of the province to enact
orders and strategies for surplus animals in a border closure situation
whether resulting from either a foreign animal disease (FAD) or non
FAD event.
14. Consider who will take the lead in a border closure incident caused
by a non-FAD, as well as the individual responsibilities of both industry
stakeholders and government.
15. Develop an action plan with industry to deal with orderly marketing
in the event of a border closure.
16. Species specific plans for dealing with the impacts of a border
closure event should be considered.
17. Investigate options and strategies for managing surplus healthy
animals.
18. Ensure that housing and feeding options for extending on-farm
times and delaying marketing for various livestock commodities have
been fully explored and documented keeping in mind animal welfare
considerations.
19. Investigate options for managing surplus meat products.
20. Investigate and document proper euthanasia methods for depopulating
livestock farms.
21. Encourage completion of a mass carcass disposal options plan.
22. Investigate the potential limitations to increasing slaughter
capacity within the province and whether these limitations can be
mitigated.
23. Explore possible solutions to the limitations on additional capacity
in the rendering sector particularly as it relates to weekend operation.
24. Consider options should processors or renderers find themselves
inside a restricted movement zone in the event of FAD.
25. Feed ingredients that are currently imported may have to be manufactured
domestically. Evaluate whether these ingredients can be manufactured
domestically, and if not, why not.
26. Investigate options for business continuity programs from farm
through processing in order to help maintain the infrastructure and
sustainability of Ontario's livestock sector through a border closure
incident.
27. Identify potential financial support for the supply chain to assist
in finding solutions to the impacts of a border closure.
28. Investigate the current availability and further need for support
services that would help individuals and families through difficult
circumstances (both financial and stress related).
Stage 2 of the project will be using these recommendations as the basis for developing a livestock border closure contingency plan.
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